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En búsqueda de un equilibrio elusivo: un análisis comparativo de la elección social y la elección pública
Keywords:
social choice, public choice, logrolling, impossibility theorem, median voter theorem, structural induced equilibrium.Abstract
Social Choice and Public Choice are theories that share theoretical assumptions. Nevertheless, each one offers different solutions to the instability problem of decision making. This article seeks to clarify the similarities and differences between these theories. In a nutshell, social choice studies the aggregation of individual preferences, the theory assumes that individuals have ordinal preferences and that these actors do not interact with each other. In contrast, public choice maintains that political decisions are the result of interactions, particularly exchanges among political actors who value issues with different intensity.Downloads
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References
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Weingast, B., y Marshall, W. (1988). The industrial organization of Congress: or, why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets. Journal of Political Economy, 96(1), 132-163. Recuperado de https://www.jstor.org/stable/1830714
Adams, J., Merrill III, S., y Groffman, B. (2005). A Unified Theory of Party Competition: A CrossNational Analysis Integrating Spatial and Behavioral Theories. Nueva York: Cambridge University Press.
Ansolabehere, S., y Snyder, J. (2000). Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models. Public Choice, 103(3/4), 327-336. doi https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005020606153
Ansolabehere, S. (2006). Voters, Candidates and Parties. En D. Wittman, y B. Weingast (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy (pp. 29-49). Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi: DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.003.0002
Arrow, K. (1950). A Dificulty in the Concept of Social Welfare. Journal of Political Economy, 58(4), 328-46. Recuperado de https://www.jstor.org/stable/1828886
Arrow, K. (1951). Social Choice and Individual Values. Nueva York: Cowles Foundation.
Black, D. (1948). The Decisions of a Committee Using Special Majority. Econometrica, 16, 245-61. doi: DOI: 10.2307/1907278
Brennan, G., y Buchanan, J. (2000 [1985]). The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Buchanan, J. (1954). Social choice, democracy, and free markets. Journal of Political Economy, 62(2), 114-23. Recuperado de https://www.jstor.org/stable/1825570
Buchanan, J. (1979). What should economist do? Indianapolis: Liberty Press.
Buchanan, J. (1984). Politics without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory and Its Normative Implications. En J. Buchanan, y R. Tollison (eds.), The Theory of Public Choice II (pp. 11-22). The University of Michigan Press.
Buchanan, J. (2006). Politics and Scientific Enquiry: Retrospective on a Half-Century, En B. Weingast, y D. Wittman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi: DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.003.0055
Buchanan, J., y Gordon T. (1962). The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of a Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Cox, G., y Matthew, M. (2005). Setting the agenda: responsible party government in the US House of representatives. Nueva York: Cambridge University Press.
Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. Nueva York: Harper and Row.
Feldman, A., y Roberto S. (2006). Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory. Nueva York: Springer.
Ferejohn, J. (1986). Logrolling in an institutional context: A case study of food stemp legislation. En G. Wright, L. Riselbach y L. C. Dodd (eds.), Congress and Policy Change, Nueva York: Agathon Press INC.
Hinich, M., y Munger, M. (2003). Teoría Analítica de la Política. Barcelona: Gedisa.
Holcombe, R. (2013). Institutions and Constitutions: The Economic World of James M. Buchanan. En L. Dwight (ed.), Public Choice, Past and Present: The Legacy of James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (pp. 17-32). Nueva York: Springer.
Lackner, M., y Lackner, M. (2017). On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences. Social Choice Welfare, 48(4), 717-745. doi: DOI: 10.1007/s00355-017-1033-0
Marginson, S. (2016). The Dream is Over: The Crisis of Clark Kerr’s California Idea of Higher Education. University of California Press.
McKelvey, R., y Ordeshook, P. (1980). Vote trading: An experimental study. Public Choice, 35(2), 151-84. doi: https://www.jstor.org/stable/30023792
McKelvey, R. (1976). Instrasitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control. Journal of Economic Theory, 12(3), 472-82. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(76)90040-5
Mitchell, W. (1999). Political Science and Public Choice: 1950-1970. Public Choice, 98(3), 237-249. Recuperado de https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v98y1999i3-4p237-49.html
Mueller, D. (2015). Public choice, social choice, and political economy. Public Choice, 163(3-4): 379-387. Recuperado de https://www.jstor.org/stable/24507539
Munger, M., y Munger, K. (2015). Choosing in Groups: Analytical Politics Revisited. Nueva York: Cambridge University Press.
Plott, C. (1967). A notion of equilibrium and its possibility under majority rule. American Economic Review 57(4), 787-806. Recuperado de https://www.jstor.org/stable/1815369
Riker, W. (1982a). Liberalism against Populism. San Francisco: Freeman
Riker, W. (1982b). Implications from Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions. En P. Ordeshook, y K. Shepsle (eds.), Political Equilibrium (pp. 3-24), Boston: Kluwer Nijhoff Publishing.
Roessler, C., Sandro, S., y Strulovici, B. (2013). The Roman metro problem: dynamic voting and the limited power of commitment. Discussion Paper 1560, Kellog School of Management, pp. 1-30. Recuperado en http://hdl.handle.net/10419/97260
Romer, T., y Rosenthal, H. (1978). Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo. Public Choice, 33(4), 27-43. Recuperado de https://www.jstor.org/stable/30023066
Shepsle, K. (1986). Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions. En H.Weisberg (ed.), Political Science: The science of politics (pp. 51-80) Nueva York: Agathon Press INC.
Shepsle, K. (2010). Analyzing Politics, Rationality, Behavior and Institutions. Nueva York: W.W. Norton & Company.
Shepsle, K., y Weingast, B. (1981). Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice. Public Choice, 37(2), 503-19. Recuperado en https://www.jstor.org/stable/30023510
Shepsle, K., y Weingast, B. (2012). Why so much stability? Majority voting, legislative institutions, and Gordon Tullock. Public Choice, 152(1), 83-95. Recuperado en https://www.jstor.org/stable/41483754
Shughart, W., y Tollison, R. (2005). The Unfinished Business of Public Choice. Public Choice, 124(1/2), 237-47. Recuperado en https://www.jstor.org/stable/30026712
Stratmann, T. (1997). Logrolling. En D. Mueller (ed.), Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook (pp. 332-341). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511664458
Tullock, G., y Brennan, G. (1981). Why so much stability. Public Choice, 37(2), 189-205. Recuperado de https://www.jstor.org/stable/30023475
Tullock, G. (2002). The Theory of Public Choice. En G. Tullock, A. Seldon, y G. Brady (eds.), Government Failure: A Primer in Public Choice (3-82). Washington DC: Cato Institute.
Weingast, B., y Marshall, W. (1988). The industrial organization of Congress: or, why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets. Journal of Political Economy, 96(1), 132-163. Recuperado de https://www.jstor.org/stable/1830714
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Published
2021-09-10
How to Cite
Solis Delgadillo, D., & Cortez Salinas, J. (2021). En búsqueda de un equilibrio elusivo: un análisis comparativo de la elección social y la elección pública. Espiral Estudios Sobre Estado Y Sociedad (eISSN: 2594-021X), 28(82). Retrieved from https://espiral.cucsh.udg.mx/index.php/EEES/article/view/7217
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